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Abstract  
Many advocates for using compulsory licensing (“CL”) for pharmaceutical patents in 
developing countries like Thailand rest their case in part on the purported use of  CL in the United 
States. In this paper we take issue with that proposition on several grounds. As a theoretical matter, 
we argue that the basic presumption in favor of  voluntary licenses for IP should apply in the 
international arena, in addition to the domestic one. In the international context, voluntary licenses 
are of  special importance because they strengthen the supply chain for distributing pharmaceuticals 
and ease the government enforcement of  safety standards. Next, this paper analyzes several of  the 
key illustrations of  purported CL for drug patents in the United States and shows that the use of  CL 
elsewhere deviates in material ways from the standard U.S. practices. These are the compulsory 
copyright licenses for music; the award of  damages instead of  injunctions after eBay v. MercExchange, 
and the use of  compulsory licenses in antitrust settlements. Whatever the ultimate desirability of  
these American doctrines, none of  them seeks to reduce the payment on licenses to the marginal 
cost of  the licensed goods. Any need to help poor people gain access should not rely on CL, but 
instead should rely on tools precisely aimed at that purpose, including direct government purchases 
of  patented drugs from their manufacturers at negotiated prices.  
                                                 
* Epstein is the Laurence A. Tisch Professor of  Law, New York University the Peter and Kirstin Bedford Senior Fellow at 
Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, and. James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of  Law at the University of  
Chicago, Kieff  is a Professor at the George Washington University Law School and the Ray & Louise Knowles Senior Fellow 
at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution. This draft was presented at the “Law & Economics Conference: The Licensing of  
Intellectual Property” held at the University of  Chicago Law School June 18-19, 2010. This work is part of  the ongoing 
Hoover Project on Commercializing Innovation, which studies the law, economics, and politics of  innovation and which is 
available on-line at www.innovation.hoover.org. We thank Brett Davenport, New York University Law School, Class of  2012 
for his prompt and expert research assistance. 
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Patented pharmaceuticals play a key role in addressing a wide range of  public health 
problems in both the developed and undeveloped world. As is commonly understood, all patents 
lead a two-sided life. On the one hand, patents are praised as a spur to innovation, which is only 
made possible with the predictable enforcement of  rights of  exclusion for the patented technology. 
These patents are typically strong for pharmaceuticals because they are often well-defined single 
chemical entities that have no perfect substitute. That distinctive feature often leads to prices that 
exceed marginal costs. This price gap can, consequently, easily result in excluding drug use by 
individuals with limited financial means, especially those in undeveloped or developing nations. The 
hard trade-off  between innovation and dissemination has led to extensive debates about whether 
and how the patents are helping or hurting overall social welfare, especially in poorer countries. 
Worried that a patentee’s right to exclude will unduly limit treatment of  illnesses such as AIDS, heart 
disease and cancer within its borders, Thailand has recently taken the bold move of  ordering several 
major drug companies to engage in compulsory licensing (“CL”).1 Debates about the wisdom of  CL 
are multi-factored and ongoing; their full range is beyond the scope of  this paper.2 We simply 
mention here that compulsory licensing is a species of  forced exchange that is generally analyzed in 
                                                 
1 See THAI MINISTRY OF PUB. HEALTH & NAT'L HEALTH SEC. OFFICE, FACTS AND EVIDENCES ON THE 10 BURNING 
ISSUES RELATED TO THE GOVERNMENT USE OF PATENTS ON THREE PATENTED ESSENTIAL DRUGS IN THAILAND: DOCUMENT 
TO SUPPORT STRENGTHENING OF SOCIAL WISDOM ON THE ISSUE OF DRUG PATENT (Vichai Chokevivat ed., 2007), available at 
http://www.moph.go.th/hot/White Paper CL-EN.pdf  [hereinafter Thai White Paper I] (discussing CL for drugs to treat AIDS 
and heart disease); see also THAI MINISTRY OF PUB. HEALTH & NAT'L HEALTH SEC. OFFICE, THE 10 BURNING QUESTIONS 
REGARDING THE GOVERNMENT USE OF PATENTS ON THE FOUR ANTI-CANCER DRUGS IN THAILAND (2008), available at 
http://www.moph.go.th/hot/White paper CL II FEB 08-ENG.pdf  [hereinafter Thai White Paper II]. Brazil has also adopted a 
CL approach. See Jon Cohen, Brazil, Thailand Override Big Pharma Patents, 316 SCI. 816 (2007).  
2 For a helpful review, see Cynthia M. Ho, Unveiling Competing Patent Perspectives, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1047 (2009).  
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connection with the question of  takings.3 The government taking of  the license is, in theory at least, 
supposed to provide just compensation to the person who has been deprived of  his or her property. 
At the very least, these exchanges raise the question of  which patents should be subject to these 
licenses and how that compensation should be computed, which gives rise to immense tactical and 
public choice issues when several similar patents are all subject to such use.  
We think, therefore, that a presumption against CL follows from the more general 
presumption against forced exchanges found in a wide range of  divergent legal settings. The 
defenders of  CL for pharmaceuticals do so not only at the level of  generality, but also on the 
narrower claim that CL must be an acceptable practice because it is a common norm in the United 
States, which has strong free market tendencies. As the government of  Thailand put it:  
Thailand is not the first country to apply compulsory licensing or the Government 
Use of  patent, developed countries including the USA, European countries, and 
other developing countries have previously attempted and implemented compulsory 
licensing and Government Use of  Patents.4 
Accordingly, Part II of  this paper starts with a discussion of  the distinctive position of  
patents in the pharmaceutical sector, relative to other areas of  technology. It shows that many of  the 
current criticisms about patents are particularly weak for patents in the pharmaceutical field while 
the case for enforcement of  patents in pharmaceuticals is particularly strong. Part  III then focuses 
on risks of  CL. Part  IV explores alternatives to CL that more directly address the persistent 
problems of  poverty that seem to drive the insistent demands for CL. Part  V explores the central 
examples of  purported CL in the United States to which the Thai advocates of  CL turn in order to 
expose their marked difference from a CL regime. Part  VI concludes.  
II. THE DISTINCTIVE NICHE OF PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS 
Many critics of  today’s patent system insist that its system of  exclusive rights frustrates the 
very forms of  technological innovation that patents are supposed to advance. The heart of  these 
arguments boils down to two key purported defects within the basic patent system that are said to 
compromise its effectiveness. First is the claim that the obscure boundary lines for individual patents 
makes it difficult for other entrepreneurs to know whether their activities infringe on someone else’s 
patents or not. As Bessen and Meurer put it, third parties have become “innocent violators” of  
patents, by making investments they think are not infringing but “[t]hose investments were exposed 
to unnecessary risk because of  unclear property boundaries.”5 Second is the idea that acute 
fragmentation of  property rights blocks any entrepreneur from assembling the needed technologies 
for advancing their own operations.6 According to Heller and Eisenberg: “Current examples in 
biomedical research demonstrate two mechanisms by which a government might inadvertently 
                                                 
3 For discussion, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE: HOW EXCESSIVE REGULATION STIFLES PHARMACEUTICAL 
INNOVATION, 82-96 (2006). 
4 See, e.g., THAI MINISTRY OF PUB. HEALTH & NAT’L HEALTH SEC. OFFICE, Thai White Paper I, supra note 1, at 4 and 
accompanying documents 14, 15 & 26.  
5 JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATION 
AT RISK 2 (2008). For more detailed discussion of  the topic, see id. at 46-72. 
6 See, e.g., MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS 
INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES (2008). 
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create an anticommons: either by creating too many concurrent fragments of  intellectual property 
rights in potential future products or by permitting too many upstream patent owners to stack 
licenses on top of  the future discoveries of  downstream users.”7 
We recognize that these objections could prove weighty in many areas of  technology.8 
Computer hardware and software patents, for example, are often said to have little value because 
they are too small in scope, too evanescent in utility, and too numerous in practice.9 One way to 
eliminate these endless borderline disputes is to revert to a public domain system in which trade 
secrets become the only (if  limited) form of  intellectual property (“IP”) protection.  
Pharmaceutical patents, however, are not subject to these twin objections because they cover 
a single chemical entity, or a group of  well-defined compounds in composition. The distinct nature 
of  these products, and their precise chemical formulation, significantly mitigates concerns about 
boundary disputes. In addition, these compounds typically have direct value to end users in treating 
particular patients, either alone or in conjunction with one or two other compounds. That direct link 
between patent and consumer product significantly mitigates concerns about fragmentation.  
A third objection to general patent enforcement is that it requires product licensing, which 
can pose unwanted delays when the patented technology is most needed. Just this concern 
motivated the international trade agreement known as TRIPS to allow for the use of  CL in times of  
national emergency.10 The Thai CL does not, however, meet the customary definition of  an 
emergency because it is directed exclusively toward chronic and long-term conditions. In many cases, 
moreover, licenses can be negotiated while patents are pending, insulating most pharmaceutical 
products from this criticism.  
Moreover, the positive case for patents is particularly strong for pharmaceuticals. The huge, 
lengthy, and risky investments that are needed to bring a typical new molecular entity to market 
today exceed one billion dollars.11 That large sum is needed to meet the extensive technical, 
regulatory, and dissemination barriers that drugs must be overcome before reaching market—
barriers that are wholly absent, for example, for patents on computer products All pharmaceuticals, 
                                                 
7 Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 
698, 699 (1998).  
8 We also have previously offered a range of  reasons why such concerns are often overblown or better addressed through 
private ordering than through legal reform. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein & Bruce N. Kuhlik, Navigating the Anticommons for 
Pharmaceutical Patents: Steady the Course on Hatch-Waxman 4 (Univ. of  Chi. Law Sch. John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ. 
Working Paper No. 209 (2d ser.), 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=536322 (exploring some reasons why the 
problems are likely to be less prevalent than feared); F. Scott Kieff, On Coordinating Transactions in Intellectual Property: A Response to 
Smith's Delineating Entitlements in Information, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 101, 106-09 (2007) (exploring additional reasons); F. 
Scott Kieff  & Troy A. Paredes, Engineering a Deal: Toward a Private Ordering Solution to the Anticommons Problem, 48 B.C. L. REV. 111 
(2007) (offering a private ordering solution for cases where the problems persist).  
9 See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Tradable Patent Rights, 60 STAN. L. REV. 863, 864 (2007) (“Patent thickets can be found in several key 
industries, such as semiconductors, biotechnology, computer software, and the Internet.”); Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent 
Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. 
eds., 2001), available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/thicket.pdf  (providing the same observation). 
10 Final Act Embodying the Results of  the Uruguay Round of  Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 
1125 (1994).  
11 See Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen & Henry G. Grabowski, The Price of  Innovation: New Estimates of  Drug 
Development Costs, 232 J. HEALTH ECON. 151 (2003) (estimating $800 million); for a higher estimate, see Jim Gilbert, Preston 
Henske & Ashish Singh, Rebuilding Big Pharma’s Business Model, 21 IN VIVO: BUS. MED. REP. 73 (2003) (estimating $1.7 billion). 
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whether patented or generic, face the ever-longer clinical trials mandated by the Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”). These trials both impose high direct out-of-pocket costs; they reduce the 
number of  years that a new drug can be sold on the market with patent protection; and they 
postpone the date when the new drug first generations any revenues.The Hatch-Waxman Act,12 
which extends the patent period up to five years to offset these FDA delays, only makes a dent in the 
problem. Ordinary products have close to a 17-year useful life, a period that reflects the three years 
that patent examination reduces from the 20-year statutory term. In contrast, the typical effective 
patent life for pharmaceuticals in the United States today is under 12 years for drugs with over $100 
million in annual sales, which, not surprisingly, comprised 90% of  sales in the brand market in the 
United States in 2005. That effective period is even lower for some segments.13 The revenues that 
major patents generate can be billions of  dollars per year.  
There is, moreover, no effective substitute for patents. Any government prizes and 
inducements are puny in comparison, and are only payable to a few actors at most. Prizes, similar to 
draft picks in competitive sports, often rank products in the wrong order by commercial value. Like 
other forms of  industrial policy, government agents or philanthropists are not good at picking 
winners. We recognize that patent protection should not be available in the production of  ideas, but 
no Nobel Prize for patent development can hope to supply the broad reaching and powerful 
incentives of  patents, or allow for the coordination of  the efforts by the multiple actors needed to 
convert medical knowledge into useful therapeutic products. The want of  exclusive rights creates a 
giant barrier to commercialization.14 
To top it all off, the value of  a pharmaceutical patent is further compromised by the 
proliferation of  government programs—such as those administered under Medicare and 
Medicaid—that fix the sale of  drugs at prices below market levels. The government insists that 
reduced payments are needed to offset the government subsidy to individuals who would never be 
able to purchase these products on their own in the first place. These government-imposed systems 
of  price discrimination can remove excessive profits on inframarginal sales. Yet these mandate 
programs will misfire if  the government sets prices below the marginal cost of  selling these 
additional units, which forces firms to lose money on these added transactions. Yet, ironically, the 
very people who insist on Medicare and Medicaid discounts also criticize the common practice of  
price discrimination for patented drugs in voluntary markets on the ground that only equal prices 
can meet a norm of  fundamental fairness to all potential takers. However, voluntary markets exhibit 
no such norm. Constantly revised prices are commonplace in leasing, hotel, and airline markets, 
where they allow firms to efficiently spread their joint fixed costs over inelastic portions of  their 
customer base.15 These niceties often elude the critics, whose efforts to eliminate price 
discrimination could prevent the patentee from recovering the fixed costs of  the original patented 
                                                 
12 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of  1984 (Hatch-Waxman Act), Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 
1585 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (2006)). 
13 See Henry G. Grabowski & Margaret Kyle, Generic Competition and Market Exclusivity Periods in Pharmaceuticals, 28 
MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECON. 491-502 (2007). 
14 For more on the limitations of  prizes, tax credits, and other rewards as substitutes for patents, see F. SCOTT KIEFF, ON 
THE ECONOMICS OF PATENT LAW AND POLICY, IN PATENT LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 
34-40 (Toshiko Takenaka ed., 2009). 
15 Michael E. Levine, Price Discrimination without Market Power. 19 YALE J. REG. 1 (2002). 
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invention, with deleterious effects on innovation.16 Nothing in theory or practice shakes the initial 
presumption against CL for pharmaceutical patents. 
III. RISKS OF COMPULSORY LICENSING 
The dangers of  CL are more apparent when one sees how governments implement them in 
practice. A central risk of  CL is that it gives the national government untrammeled discretion to 
select those firms that may sell the patented drug in the local country free of  the patent. Thereafter, 
either the firm or the government, or both, set all prices for all units sold, which need not reflect any 
share of  the high fixed costs of  drug development, or even the licensor’s full cost of  drug 
distribution, which could easily exceed its manufacturing costs.  
One standard justification offered for CL is that it removes the monopoly element of  pricing 
for patented drugs when it faces no credible competition from alternative sources. These sources 
include non-infringing drugs that are already on the market or which will come on thereafter. 
However, this vision of  CL cannot be applied universally because marginal cost pricing makes it 
impossible for firms and their investors to recover their fixed costs of  generating and running their 
operation. The long-term consequences are not acceptable.  
A. Impaired Incentives to Develop New Drugs 
CL at marginal cost will reduce the ability to tap key revenue streams needed to offset those 
fixed costs of  development.17 In some cases, the loss of  revenues will result in a delay of  new drugs. 
In other cases, it will result in the abandonment of  newly unprofitable projects. These losses will be 
felt not only in the country that imposes CL, but everywhere else as well. The impact will be 
especially large for those drugs targeting so-called orphan diseases most prevalent in those countries 
that champion CL. For other long-term investments, recovery for these fixed costs must be allowed 
to prevent confiscation when, for example, a public utility makes a large front-end investment that 
regulation prevents it from recovering over the life of  its new facility.18  
B. Coerced and Concealed Wealth Transfer  
Implementing CL system in country A necessarily forces individuals in other nations to bear 
all those fixed costs. This back-door subsidy has serious negative consequences for consumers 
outside of  the CL country. Those covert methods of  wealth transfer avoid open deliberation, 
frustrate normal democratic discipline, deprive the donors of  recognition for their beneficence, 
encourage wasted arbitrage transactions across national borders, and invite never-ending rounds of  
tit-for-tat trade wars.  
The risks could easily multiply. First, a call for CL based on some alleged need can be applied 
to almost any area of  technology. Second, the recent uses of  CL are not addressed to any transitory 
crisis in a particular country—think plague—that requires instantaneous response, but cover chronic 
                                                 
16 See John F. Duffy, The Marginal Cost Controversy in Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 37 (2004). On the importance of  
price discrimination in the context of  antitrust litigation, see In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 186 F.3d 
781 (7th Cir. 1999). 
17 For costs, see supra note 11.  
18 See Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989) (detailing alternative methods of  compensation).  
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medical conditions like AIDS, heart disease, and cancer, for which it is possible to plan in advance. 
Within a competitive context, no litmus test helps decide which drugs within a particular class 
should be subject to a CL, and which should not. The selective use of  CL reduces the rate of  return 
for licensed drugs, which in turn subsidizes the competitor that escapes CL treatment. In the end, 
the rates of  return are negatively impacted for both. Selective CL might also trigger fresh restrictions 
on the use of  rival or complementary products, which negatively impacts the overall market.  
C. Impaired Commercialization and Distribution of  Drugs 
CL also may have negative implications for the commercialization and distribution of  drugs. 
The self-conscious deviation from standard property and contract rights undermines incentives for 
private actors to invest or conduct business in areas where property rights are not secure. The ironic 
effect is that weak property rights in drugs will create large gaps in drug coverage that the 
proponents of  CL hope to close, usually by transfers to sympathetic groups such as the poor at 
below market rates. Big businesses may not like CL, but they can fend for themselves by investing 
elsewhere. That mitigation strategy has both private and social costs, but these will likely be small 
given the mobility of  capital for the creation of  information goods. Regrettably, the poor people in 
these underdeveloped regions are not so mobile, so they pay dearly when denied the benefit of  grass 
roots distribution systems for food and medicines. The point may seem paradoxical because drugs 
under CL should be cheaper as a first approximation than those that are not.  
It is, of  course, one thing to impose CL, but it is quite another to develop a reliable 
distributional system that gets the right drugs to the right places in the right conditions. This issue of  
distribution is no small matter. Gaps in the supply chain can lead to theft and the substitution of  
counterfeit drugs for the real ones, which are in turn diverted to the black market. In addition, the 
lack of  commercial distribution channels could lead to a failure to maintain sensitive pharmaceutical 
compounds in proper condition, exposing users to manufacturing defects that may not easily be 
detected by inspection prior to use, and for which there will be no effective legal remedy after the 
fact. Excluding private drug producers from the market thus places local citizens at the mercy of  an 
inferior local distribution system. Additionally, that compromised system is not matched with cost 
savings. CL only deals with wholesale prices. Yet, to consumers, what matters is the price at retail, 
which could easily go up even as the wholesale price goes down. We know that the balky European 
distribution systems often increase the price of  generic drugs. Those same risks, vastly amplified, 
exist in third world countries.  
Driving out western distribution systems from local economies could also have serious 
collateral consequences. Reducing IP opportunities could help induce a mini brain drain as local 
engineers and entrepreneurs leave either the sector or the country in search of  better opportunities 
elsewhere. In addition, weak intellectual property protection may scare away foreign investors who 
might otherwise direct research to treat local subpopulations in need of  novel but targeted therapies. 
Moreover, the reduction in overall commercial traffic could slow down the formation of  the 
technical and political infrastructure needed to support a mature system of  drug manufacturing and 
distribution.  
The problems with weak distribution systems are already serious. In countries like China, 
distribution costs constitute an enormous portion of  a drug’s cost, which private distributors could 
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reduce. At the same time, gaps in safety regulations have spawned public health crises both in China 
and in other countries that import Chinese-made drugs, including the United States.19 Profitable 
private distribution problems are easier targets for state regulation, which can rely on brand name 
loyalty to keep suppliers in line. Local distribution companies with weak brands are far more likely to 
exercise corrupt influence over their own national regulators, who are often reluctant to clamp down 
on domestic commercial firms.   
IV. GOVERNMENT PURCHASE AS COMPULSORY LICENSING ALTERNATIVE 
Most undeveloped countries think that access to needed drugs is an essential portion of  a 
system that provides minimum health security to all its citizens. We forego any discussion here of  
how this program might be implemented, given that each nation should design whatever system of  
positive rights it regards as appropriate for its own citizens. However, it hardly follows that each state 
thereby has some strong entitlement to fund these subsidies from the foreign pharmaceutical 
manufacturers or from their customers in other countries. Internal revenues should be the source of  
government-mandated domestic subsidies. 
Poorer countries, moreover, can get attractive deals even without demanding any express or 
implicit subsidy. Price discrimination is a common feature in pharmaceutical markets, which 
functions as a response to selling products with high initial and low marginal costs of  production. 
Given the limitations on local wealth, price discrimination should let less developed countries buy 
goods at far lower prices than they sell for, say, in the United States.20 So long as the local prices 
exceed the marginal costs of  sale, everyone wins. To be sure, prices in developed countries are not 
likely to fall by having poorer countries pick up part of  the slack. Pharmaceutical manufacturers are 
likely to sell at the previous profit-maximizing level even after making the new sales. Rather, the 
increase in the total return should, in the long-run, increase new investment in drugs, which in turn 
will put price pressure on established products. In other cases, larger research budgets will open up 
possibilities to treat otherwise untreatable conditions. Either way, a robust global market with price 
discrimination should increase the sum of  consumer and producer surplus, which is the correct 
social measure of  welfare.  
If  local governments want to drive prices even further, it should use its own resources by 
buying medicines (often in bulk) at one price and thereafter distributing them to its own citizens at 
lower prices, or indeed for free. Putting the subsidy on the public books increases transparency, 
which is always an aid to democratic deliberation. CL is not the only system that produces these 
distortions; another example is the system of  rent control used in some U.S. cities. Rent control 
allows governments to force local landlords to rent property to tenants at below-market prices. The 
larger the subsidy, the greater the economic distortion in the form of  reduced services to tenants, 
slower tenant turnover, heightened administrative costs, constant squabbles between landlord and 
                                                 
19 Gardiner Harris, U.S. Identifies Tainted Heparin in 11 Countries, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2008, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/22/health/policy/22fda.html.  
20 See Patricia M. Danzon, Neglected Diseases: At what price?, 449 NATURE 176 (2007); Patricia M. Danzon & Michael F. 
Furukawa, Prices and Availability of  Pharmaceuticals: Evidence from Nine Countries, HEALTH AFFAIRS - WEB EXCLUSIVE 521, 534 
(2003), http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w3.521v1.pdf  (“Our finding that drug price differentials between 
countries roughly reflect income differences (except for Chile and Mexico) plausibly reflects the interaction of  drug 
manufacturers’ pricing strategies, using income as a rough proxy for demand elasticities, and regulation.”); Patricia M. Danzon 
& Michael F. Furukawa, International Prices and Availability of  Pharmaceuticals in 2005, 27 HEALTH AFF. 22 (2008).  
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tenant, and endless political maneuvering to either preserve or eliminate the subsidy.21 Yet, once 
again, these problems are largely solved by having the government, after open political deliberation, 
rent units at market value, which it can then sublet at a reduced price or for free. The government 
thus retains the complete power to determine the size of  the subsidy without forcing the individual 
landlords to bear the brunt of  a program introduced for the benefit of  the community at large.22 
This misguided technique thus can produce large social losses for any good. Any insistence that 
drugs are “special” is the sure road to policy mistakes.  
Even if, moreover, domestic sources are insufficient to meet the challenge, it hardly follows 
that local governments should be free to use CL to expropriate protected patents. Foreign aid and 
international credit are often, but not universally, available. Programs of  this sort make an attractive 
aim for foreign aid programs, but not necessarily ones of  the highest priority; water purification and 
malaria control could easily rank higher in many places. But whatever the rankings, we see no reason 
why the access to foreign drug companies is a way to boost the priority of  transfers for these 
purposes over those for others. The proper targets for foreign aid should depend in part on the 
prices that drug companies charge for their products. On this score, both volume discounts and 
price discrimination remain available as tools to keep prices down. Of  course, in some instances, the 
drug companies themselves might (and indeed often do) offer these drugs at below costs—often for 
humanitarian reasons—subject to conditions that are aimed to prevent their resale into third 
countries. These conditions are always to the benefit of  the local poor, for without them the profits 
from resale to third countries only redound for the benefit of  local oligarchs. In short, CL is not 
necessary to produce any of  the legitimate local objectives of  government.  
V. INACCURATE CLAIMS OF COMPULSORY LICENSING IN THE UNITED STATES  
The defenders of  CL in Thailand point to the frequency of  purported CL now in use in the 
United States.23 These forms of  CL use fall into the following categories: broadcast licenses, federal 
court cases that deny injunctive relief, federal or state sovereign immunity and associated takings, 
and antitrust enforcement proceedings. We recognize that it is easy to lump all of  these together as 
approaches that avoid full enforcement of  a property right. Our purpose here is not to defend these 
decisions, which we have often opposed. We only wish to show that, however unwise in their own 
terms, these practices should not be viewed as instances of  CL. The purported CL now being 
conducted in the United States is distinguishable from the CL used in Thailand for pharmaceutical 
products in key respects.  
A. Broadcast licensing 
 The U.S. regime of  compulsory licensing of  copyrighted songs (which have their own 
problems) is worlds apart from pharmaceutical CL. It is important to note, as well, that this system 
is not intended to displace a successful system of  voluntary licenses because of  unhappiness with 
the prices charged. Rather, this use of  CL is a response to the need to compensate holders of  songs 
                                                 
21 For a discussion on the topic, see Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory of  Efficient Regulation, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 
741 (1988). For the latest political distortion under rent stabilization in New York, see Roberts v. Tishman Speyer Props., 918 
N.E.2d 900 (N.Y. 2009). 
22 See Pennell v. City of  San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1988). 
23 See, e.g., Thai White Paper I, supra note 1, at 1 and accompanying documents 14, 15, & 26.  
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that many parties use in the ordinary course of  their business. Each infringement is small, but the 
sum of  all infringements is large. CL thus functions as a transaction cost-saving device that permits 
the rapid dissemination of  copyrighted material. The prices of  these licenses are, moreover, not 
determined by the fiat of  an interested government party, but are subject to elaborate industry-wide 
negotiation systems that are intended, in part, to secure a fair return for the holder of  the IP.24 
CHECK Expropriation and wealth transfer are not part of  this system. With that said, a CL 
framework may not be efficient so long as copyright holders can pool their resources for sale. At this 
point, antitrust issues can emerge,25 but these can be partly obviated by allowing all parties in the 
pools to license outside the pools—an option, of  course, that is never available in CL systems. 
Indeed, CL systems often block the creation of  efficient modes of  voluntary sale, such as the reagent 
freezer programs that private firms have long used to supply patented biological reagents to basic 
research scientists. This approach has resulted in transaction costs for the scientists that are lower 
than those of  purchasing a can of  soda from a vending machine.26 Pharmaceutical products simply 
do not present the high volume and low value settings where CL licenses make their appearance. 
B. Denial of  injunctive relief   
The next purported example of  CL in the United States relates to the 2006 Supreme Court 
decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange.27 This case displaced the traditional rule for patent disputes, 
under which “courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent infringement absent exceptional 
circumstances.”28 In its place, the Supreme Court substituted a four-factor test to decide between 
damages and injunctive relief: 
A plaintiff  must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that 
remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that 
injury; (3) that, considering the balance of  hardships between the plaintiff  and defendant, a 
remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a 
permanent injunction.29 
In practice, this new test is both more complex and less protective of  property than the 
earlier rule. Indeed, we jointly argued against its adoption for just that reason.30 We urged that that 
the clear boundary lines secured by relief  facilitated the voluntary transactions needed to 
commercialize patented technologies. Only such strong protection prevents potential customers 
                                                 
24 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“The immediate effect of  our copyright law is to 
secure a fair return for an ‘author's’ creative labor. . . . for the general public good.”). 
25 See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (applying rule of  reason to blanket broadcast 
licenses).  
26 See F. Scott Kieff, Coordination, Property & Intellectual Property: An Unconventional Approach to Anticompetitive Effects & 
Downstream Access, 56 EMORY L.J. 327, 379 (2006).  
27 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
28 MercExchange LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
29 eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. For more on the way these factors have long been applied by courts in equity, see F. SCOTT KIEFF 
& HENRY E. SMITH, How Not to Invent a Patent Crisis, in REACTING TO THE SPENDING SPREE: POLICY CHANGES WE CAN 
AFFORD 50, 68-69 (Terry L. Anderson & Richard Sousa eds., 2009).  
30 See Brief  for Richard A. Epstein, F. Scott Kieff  & R. Polk Wagner as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, eBay, Inc. v. 
MercExchange LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (David Teece is an additional co-author of  the document but is not listed as counsel 
on it because he is not a lawyer). For an academic version of  the defense, see Richard A. Epstein, The Property Rights Movement 
and Intellectual Property, 30 REG. 4, at 62 (2008).  
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from taking an end run around the contract system by first violating a patent and then daring the IP 
holder to initiate a costly action to recoup damages, which are always difficult to value. We also 
noted that any systematic decline of  injunctions would make it difficult for any IP holders to enter 
into exclusive contracts with preferred trading partners. Recent lower court cases have partly cut 
back on eBay in response to these concerns, typically by awarding injunctions to parties that practice 
or license their IP technologies.31 
To be sure, injunctive relief  always poses the risk that a single patent holder can dominate an 
entire technology. But the denial of  injunctive relief  poses far greater risks. Patents are always issued 
for limited times. Their subject matter is properly confined to a particular product or device. It does 
not extend to an entire area of  human endeavor. The telegraph was patented, but not total control 
over the electro-magnetic spectrum.32 A particular COX-2 inhibitor could be patented, but the 
patent on the general method of  COX-2 inhibition required more disclosure than was presented to 
the court in that case.33 In addition, the Hatch-Waxman Act creates a narrowly crafted privilege for 
experimental use. 
For all its weaknesses, however, the eBay rule bears no resemblance to the Thai CL regime, 
which depends solely on government discretion. Here are the key differences.  
First, nothing in the eBay synthesis requires national governments that use CL to rely solely 
on the four eBay factors, or indeed even take them into account. For example, these governments 
need not abandon CL upon a showing that awarding only monetary damages will cause a patentee 
irreparable injury. Nor must such a government consider the relative hardship facing the patentee. 
Nor need the government show how the CL advances the public interest, that is, the concerns of  
outsiders to the immediate dispute. In particular, CL may be imposed on a patent holder who is 
willing to commercialize the patented technology, either directly or through intermediates in the 
local economy or government.  
The relative hardship factor also points against injunctive relief  for several reasons. National 
governments have powerful alternatives if  CL is denied, while foreign corporations have no choice 
but to capitulate. Even withdrawing from a country does not preclude the local use of  CL. And 
exercising that withdrawal option could require a patentee to forego lucrative sales of  products not 
subject to CL. In contrast, the option of  state purchase at bulk discounts, followed by resale at 
below market costs to citizens in need, is always available. As a result, the four-part eBay test offers 
no justification for CL.  
In addition, CL has nothing to do with the specter of  patent trolls that influenced the eBay 
decision, even though it was not presented on the facts of  the case. Patent “trolls” are defined “as 
individual inventors who do not commercialize or manufacture their inventions.”34  Even that 
formulation excludes from the class of  “trolls” any persons who are actively engaged in licensing 
                                                 
31 See, e.g., TruePosition, Inc. v. Andrew Corp., 568 F. Supp. 2d 500 (D. Del. 2008) (involving an injunction against a direct 
competitor); TiVo, Inc. v. Echostar Commc’ns Corp., 446 F. Supp. 2d 664 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (same). 
32 O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 112-13 (1854). 
33 Univ. of  Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  
34 See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 5, at 17. Note that in addition to this “narrow” definition, the authors offer a broader 
definition that covers “all sorts of  patentees who opportunistically take advantage of  poor patent notice to assert patents 
against unsuspecting firms,” a definition that has no conceivable relevance to pharmaceutical patent disputes. 
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negotiations even if  its first voluntary license has not been completed at the time of  the defendant’s 
patent infringement. Every patent is a wasting asset, so few patent holders prefer to lurk around the 
weeds waiting to pounce on infringers when they could license their products today for a fee. It is 
foolhardy to require a patentee to rush into an unwise agreement solely to preserve its right of  
injunctive relief  against third parties. What is more, in the high profile cases of  CL for 
pharmaceutical patents, the patentees are never nonpracticing “trolls.” Instead, they are large 
companies producing and selling large quantities of  the patented drugs. Since all new entrants need 
to receive state licenses to market their goods, the class of  inadvertent infringers is likely to be 
empty.  The distinctive features of  strong pharmaceutical patents drive the risk of  “trolls” in this 
area to zero, and strengthen the case for injunctive relief. We know of  no instances in which nations 
have used CL because foreign pharmaceutical companies refused to license, directly or through 
intermediates, their product in the host country. The sole source of  dispute in CL cases is over 
price.35  Ironically, any buying nation with monopolistic buying power undermines all conceivable 
claims of  hardship that exist on the eBay scales. eBay brings the entire CL movement to a crashing 
halt. 
The accuracy of  this judgment is confirmed by the extensive case literature in the United 
States in the post-eBay period. We know of  no case that supports the use of  CL. For example, in z4 
Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,36 z4 was denied an injunction against the use by Microsoft of  z4’s 
patent activation technology. Yet the z4 patent was a tiny part of  a larger mosaic in Microsoft 
Windows and Office products. Issuing an injunction could have required a full recall of  the 
composite product. In ordinary land use cases, equitable relief  is often denied where it prejudices 
the interest of  third parties. We believe that the same result would have held under pre-eBay law as 
well. Second, Microsoft worked to eliminate any use of  the offending technology, which was 
tantamount to granting z4 injunctive relief  at some future date. Third, Microsoft had to pay $115 
million in damages for its past infringement, calculated as a reasonable royalty,37 which rightly 
includes some allowance for front-end fixed costs. So understood, this award far exceeds the 
amounts transferred under any CL license.38 This rigid standard of  damages, which far exceeds the 
amount that is typically awarded under CL, offers a much stronger incentive for parties to play by 
the particular rules up front, including by designing around or by negotiating for a license. Such 
reasonable royalty awards are the polar opposite of  CL, which has as its goal to set the CL fee as 
close to marginal cost as possible, if  not below.  
Other cases also illustrate the difference between CL and eBay. In Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV 
Group, Inc.,39 decided shortly after eBay, the court denied the injunction because the patentee had 
never taken any steps to either use or license the patented technology. Yet, it also granted a lump-
                                                 
35 Thai White Paper I, supra note 1, at 6. In the case of  Thailand, the government argued: 
Prior negotiation with the patent holders is not an effective measure and only delays the improvement of  
access to essential medicines. It is only after the threat or the decision to use and implement Compulsory 
Licensing or Government Use of  Patent that the negotiation will be more successful and effective.  
36 z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex. 2006).  
37 See Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). 
38 The operative statutory language is: “adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a 
reasonable royalty.” See id. 
39 Finisar Corp. v. The DirecTV Group, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-264, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76380, at *4 (E.D. Tex. July 7, 
2006). 
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sum award of  $79 million for the breach, which was far in excess of  any standard government 
imposed CL. Similarly, in Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp.,40 the court denied injunctive relief  on two 
grounds that have no relevance to CL cases. First, the plaintiff, Paice, did not offer to license the 
patents until the termination of  the trial. Second, the plaintiff ’s business misrepresentations drove 
away potential licensees. 
In dealing with the current law, we continue to think that the eBay standard does not always 
lead to sound results. For example, in IMX, Inc. v. Lending Tree LLC, 41 the court misstepped in 
denying a licensor the right to invoke the interests of  its exclusive licensee to obtain injunctive relief  
against the licensee’s competitor. The plaintiff  did not help its own cause by failing to file additional 
papers containing the “market or financial data” needed to support its claim.42 Yet, even then, the 
court granted enhanced damages, which are never impounded in CL. We view this case as a 
transitional development. Savvy plaintiffs now know that they can no longer rely on the older 
presumption of  injunctive relief, so they will beef  up their pleadings and proof. Over time, we think 
that the post-eBay equilibrium will shift back in favor of  the older and simpler eBay rule.  
C. Government Immunity and Takings 
Under the Takings Clause no private patentee can resist the government demand for a 
compulsory license. However, the just compensation requirement covers both fixed and marginal 
costs, which the Thai CL does not.43 The currently accepted takings analysis, moreover, easily carries 
over to intellectual property. To be sure, legal restrictions that the state imposes on patent uses by 
the patentee are governed by a low rational basis standard. But that rule should not apply when state 
intervention takes the form of  using the patent itself, or authorizing its use by private parties.44 
Although some might suggest that patents are ill-suited for takings analysis, the government’s 
decision to allow a particular market actor to use the patents of  another, which is the impact of  the 
Thai CL approach, would be no different from the government’s decision to allow the public to use 
a private marina as in Kaiser Aetna v. United States,45 or a lateral easement, as in Nollan v. California 
Coastal Council.46 Indeed, the case for constitutional protection of  patents is in many ways stronger 
than it is for real property. First, people invest in patentable inventions solely for the purpose of  
reaping an economic return. Unlike land, patents have finite lives, so no patentee postpones the use 
of  a patented technology today solely to make better use of  it tomorrow. The revenues lost today 
can never be recouped. Patents have, moreover, no personal or aesthetic uses. Accordingly, the 
investment-backed expectations that drive their owners are thus clearer for patents than for physical 
property. Nor can anyone identify any market failure that justifies a government decree that allows 
                                                 
40 Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-211, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61600 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006). 
41 IMX, Inc. V. Lendingtree, LLC, 469 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D. Del. 2007). 
42 Id. at 224-25.  
43 The governments in the United States (state and federal) have either waived their sovereign immunity, making 
themselves available in various courts for payment of  a reasonable royalty, or such suits are available to seek just compensation 
for government takings. For the connection between property and takings law, see Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of  
Intellectual Property: A Classical Liberal Response to a Premature Obituary, 62 STAN. L. REV. 455, 515-22 (2010). For a review of  the 
technicalities of  sovereign immunity and intellectual property in the United States, see Eugene Volokh, Sovereign Immunity and 
Intellectual Property, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1161 (2000).  
44 Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Protection of  Trade Secrets under the Takings Clause, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 57 (2004). 
45 444 U.S. 164 (1979). 
46 483 U.S. 825 (1987).  
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its preferred clientele to use the patented technology for free. Useful patents do not pollute the air 
or water; nor do they create any public or private nuisances that could justify state limitations on 
their use. And nothing is more common than patent licensing.  
D. Antitrust Proceedings  
Finally, proponents of  CL in Thailand also point to U.S. antitrust enforcement proceedings 
as examples of  CL in the United States. To be sure, antitrust remedies often include specific 
compulsory licenses.47 This argument puts the cart before the horse. Antitrust enforcement is a 
drawn out process that kicks in only after a defendant has been shown to abuse its significant market 
power.48 As the U.S. Supreme Court has recently re-affirmed, the possession of  a patent monopoly 
does not even count as evidence of  market power in the presence of  competitive patents.49 The 
approach to CL that was adopted by Thailand in no way purports to depend on proof  of  market 
abuse, but may be imposed at the whim of  the host country.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The efforts to justify CL for pharmaceutical patents are simply not tenable. The defenders 
of  CL fail, first, to understand the power of  the background presumption against CL. They then 
compound their initial mistake by ignoring the adverse effects that CL has even in the countries in 
which it is used. Last, they wrongly seek to bolster their tenuous case by appealing to established U.S. 
practices for copyrighted songs, injunctive relief, and antitrust policy, all of  which are driven by 
profoundly different concerns. CL for songs is an effort to make markets work in high transaction 
settings that are nowhere to be found in pharmaceutics. Both the denial of  injunctive relief  for 
patents and the use of  government takings are far from universal, and are backstopped everywhere 
by extensive damages that allow the patentee to recover some portion of  its fixed costs. In contrast, 
CL is intended to drive price as close to marginal cost as possible, if  not lower. Finally, antitrust 
remedies presuppose an abuse of  a dominant market position that the mere possession of  a patent 
establishes. It is possible to have serious reservations about some aspects of  the American legal 
synthesis and to still recognize that its breaches in the property wall pose none of  the dangers 
associated with the use of  CL in developing countries. The Thai CL was a matter of  political fiat, 
unrestrained by law. It sets a dangerous precedent that other nations should avoid, given that they 
have other sensible methods, in the form of  direct and bulk purchases, to help their own vulnerable 
populations. Perhaps these reasons are now persuasive even to the Thai government, which has not 





                                                 
47 See Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling The Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L.REV. 761, 848, n.366 (2002) (“Compulsory 
licensing was a frequently applied remedy in the 1940s and 1950s, with 107 antitrust settlements between 1941 and 1959 calling 
for such licensing or dedication of  between 40,000 and 50,000 patents.”) (collecting sources).  
48 For a recent review of  issues arising in cases involving antitrust and intellectual property, see F. Scott Kieff  et al., 
Comment on Intellectual Property, Concentration and the Limits of  Antitrust in the Biotech Seed Industry (Lewis & Clark Law Sch. Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 2010-9, George Mason Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 10-24, 2009). 
49 Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).  
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